The Choice to End a War of Choice (May 5, 2026)

BY RICHARD HAASS

Welcome to Home & Away. This edition is coming out earlier than usual, less because of events than because of my travel schedule. I want to return to the subject of last week’s edition: the two wars – the one between Russia and Ukraine and the other involving the United States, Israel, and Iran. For all the differences between them, I am struck by one similarity, namely, that both Russia (Vladimir Putin) and the United States (Donald Trump) initiated wars of choice that their leaders expected would end quickly and decisively—and yet both leaders now must confront the difficult choice of what to do when their assumptions have proven faulty.

For Putin, it will likely mean postponing indefinitely his dream of eradicating an independent Ukraine and/or separating it from the West. He cannot persist with a war that is generating tens of thousands of casualties per month, devastating Russia’s economy, and increasingly making it impossible for him and others to appear in public for fear of assassination. That Russia had to scale down its May Day parade out of worries that Ukrainian drones would destroy precious military hardware was an added humiliation. He will at some point (my bet is sooner rather than later) have to accept a ceasefire that reflects battlefield realities or, if he refuses, put his continued rule at risk. What comes to mind, should Putin not change course, is the war in Afghanistan, which accelerated the demise of the Soviet Union.

There will be internal criticism within Russia if Putin goes down this path, with voices arguing the war should be continued, should have been fought differently, or should have never begun in the first place. Still, , specifically Crimea and parts of Ukraine’s east. He surely would benefit from public relief at ending the human costs of the war, not to mention the economic benefits of a ceasefire. Putin could also claim this was only a pause, and that he did not sign away Russia’s claims to Ukraine, as a comprehensive peace agreement would likely prove to be a bridge too far for both sides.

Trump faces a comparable set of issues: . Continued war or escalation would not bring the United States closer to accomplishing these goals. On the contrary, it could lead to an outcome in which the region’s energy infrastructure is further damaged.

Meanwhile, the passage of time is problematic for Trump in two respects. As recent days have shown, . It is not difficult to see how incidents could occur and escalate. Second, the economic effects of the shutdown of the Strait – both at home and away, if you will permit me – grow by the day.

To be sure, the economic effects of a blocked Strait are also terrible for Iran. . I continue to believe a “Strait First” approach makes the most sense given the economic urgency of reopening the waterway, along with the need to avoid incidents that could lead to renewed large-scale fighting. I also think the outlines of an acceptable deal for both sides are there: a collective acceptance that the Strait is an international waterway, the creation of a new authority that would include Iran (but not be dominated by it) to oversee use of the Strait, the introduction of some modest fee structure for those transiting the Strait (one that would benefit the littoral countries, help pay for demining and cleaning up oil spills, and incentivize Iran to keep the Strait open), and the establishment of a dedicated hotline to manage any incidents. A new arrangement for the Strait could be buttressed by some sort of military presence provided by those most dependent upon the region’s exports, i.e., European and Indo-Pacific countries.

Negotiations on the nuclear issue – the other major sticking point between the two sides – could begin simultaneously or sequentially. What is in the realm of possibility would be an accord that diluted or shipped out the enriched fuel in Iran’s possession, established a ceiling on Iran’s future uranium enrichment, and reintroduced international inspectors. Iran would be told that any change to the status of its nuclear program in the interim – for example, anything that brought it closer to having a nuclear weapon – would be unacceptable and would lead to an end of the ceasefire.

The incentive for Iran to agree to an accord on the future of the Strait would be the benefit of renewed oil and gas exports to its moribund economy. The incentive for the nuclear pact would be the carrot of reduced sanctions and a return of frozen assets. All this matters to its new leaders as the Achilles’ heel of the regime remains the poor state of the country’s economy.

Would all this be difficult for Donald Trump to sign on to? No doubt. He would have to accept an Iran that had not been disarmed or humbled. His goal of regime change would have failed. The situation surrounding a reopened Strait would be somewhat worse than the status quo ante, but this would be partly offset by widespread relief at falling energy prices and restored supply chains. He could point to a nuclear pact that could or would be something of an improvement over the JCPOA. Would all this justify the war? In a word, “no.” But it should provide sufficient cover for Trump to change the conversation, placate his base and other voters, and extricate himself from the hole he dug for himself, the country, and the world.

I want to mention one other foreign policy development: the announcement that the United States will be taking at least five thousand troops out of Germany over the next year. It is happening not for strategic reasons but for political ones, namely spite over the German Chancellor’s criticism of the Iran war.

The announcement will only add to the already widespread judgment in Europe that the United States and NATO cannot be counted on. And that the United States is an untrustworthy country with an erratic leader who unilaterally imposes tariffs and starts wars—and who claims the territory of NATO countries.

Europeans would be wise to better integrate their defense efforts and to include Ukraine, increasingly the most experienced and technologically capable country in this regard, in their planning. The post-American world is fast coming into view.

It is a good time for this fan: the first-place Yankees are winning two out of every three games they play, the Knicks are into the second round of the playoffs and are playing as well as or better than anyone in the NBA, the Giants draft and free-agent signings are turning them into a promising team…and Cameron Young, my choice to win the Masters (who came in third), won another tournament.

But I want to say something about young Mr. Young that goes beyond his prodigious abilities and the pause at the top of his swing. Early in the final round of the Cadillac Championship on Sunday, he stepped up to the ball, put his club in the ground behind it, and saw the ball move. I do not believe anyone else did, but he motioned over an official, explained what had transpired, and called a penalty on himself. It cost him a stroke, which in the end didn’t matter as he won the tournament going away. But at the time he did not know whether the stroke could prove critical. Still, he did it. Character is what you do when no one else is looking or, in this way, when you choose to do the right thing even if you don’t have to. Good to see good things happening to one of the good guys.